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As independent third party, independent directors shoulder the sacred mission of 
supervising managers and reducing the agent cost since their beginning. In China, the 
independent director system was developed from the voluntarily selected system in H 
listed companies in the year of 1997, to mandatorily required to establish the system 
by SEC in 2001, then to officially clarify the system’s national legal status in 2006 
new “company law”. However，no matter whether in the west earliest birthplace or 
exotic China，actual governance effect of the independent director system is still in the 
endless debate. 
In terms of system design, the three important functions of independent director 
are the supervision of agency (Norburn, 1986; Fama and Jensen, 1983), resource 
support (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989) and 
strategic consultation (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Mintzberg, 1983). However, 
independent directors are not directly engaged in the company’s specific and trivial 
daily business activities (Johnson etc, 1996), but more engaged in monitoring internal 
control, preventing corporate finance and business risks, and avoiding outside 
investors being infringed. The existing research on the policy effect of the 
independent director system mainly  focused on two aspects: one is economic 
consequences, including the merger and acquisition capital market reaction (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992；Brickley etc, 1994)，company performance (Baysinger and Butler, 
1985; Brickley etc, 1994; Peng, 2004)，information disclosure quality (Peasnell, Pope 
and Young, 2005; YiMing Hu, SongLian Tang, 2008), CEO or director turnover 
(Lipton, Lorsch, 1992; Weisbach, 1988) and so on; the other is economic behavior, 
such as executive compensation contract design (Mehran, 1995), large shareholders' 
tunneling (Kangtao Ye, Zhengfei Lu, and Zhihua Zhang, 2007; Qingquan Tang, 2005; 
Lei Gao, 2006), the management’s on-the-job consumption (Brickley and James, 
1987). The policy effect and market reaction of independent director system have 
been tested empirically from the perspective of indicators of externally dominant 














Shivdasani and Mr yermack, 1999;Denis and Sarin,1999),the proportion of 
independent directors (Dechow,1996; Chtourou,2000;Weisbach,1988), professional 
background (Gang Wei, Zezhong Xiao,etc.,2007;Yuetang Wang,2006), Audit 
Committee (Goldman and Barlev, 1974), the scale of board of directors (Hermalin 
and weisbach, 1988; Agrawal and knoeber,1996) and so on. However, there are 
obvious differences in empirical results of the existing research on the independent 
director system and the dispute is quite large. 
The financial scandals of famous companies such as Enron and WorldCom 
indicate that whether the independent director system is able to curb fraud fruitfully is 
not only a simple system design problem, but also a deeper problem of system 
background, cultural characteristics, and the level of system designer and executives. 
Under the long term influence of other informal system such as moral philosophy and 
cultural customs, a human is not purely rational, but has the social attribute. Adams 
Smith in the “Theory of Moral Sentiments” thought that in complex social networks, 
daily activities of an individual and an organization are deeply influenced by customs 
and moral sentiment. As an emerging economy, under the deep influence of 
Confucian traditional culture, China has complied with the “face and favor” 
Confucian ethics for ordinary people and believed in the business philosophy of  
“relationship is everything”, which makes people overly depend on the social 
relationship and status hierarchy level to elect the allocator of resources, and discuss 
and determine resources allocation and transaction style. Social relations and network 
resources have become not only an important alternative form of the formal system 
like law, but also the key factors of the enterprise to strengthen the foundation and 
achieve success. Obviously, independent director system has been deeply embedded 
in the complex social relation networks, so social capital has become one of the 
prerequisites for independent directors to perform their duties, and to promote the 
company to develop healthily and continuously. 
As an exotic system, when independent director system is implanted in Chinese 
special social environment, social capital will influence the performance of functions 













developed capital market, present research in the field of corporate governance mainly 
concentrates in the proportion of independent directors, attendance rate, professional 
background, law and so on, but conclusions are divergent. In “the relationship country” 
like China, although some literatures try to research corporate governance from the 
perspective of social capital, the research mainly concentrated in the general 
managers' power, political relations, and so on. But the systematic research about the 
influence of social capital on duties of independent directors from the level of 
independent directors, still didn’t develop comprehensively, and there are very few 
related empirical studies. So under the Chinese relationship background, how is the 
governance effect of independent directors? With the provincial differences of legal 
protection degree and trust level, are there differences in the governance effect of 
independent director’s social capital? In existing research there wasn’t systematic and 
comprehensive study of independent director’s social capital, based on our 
institutional environment, this dissertation constructs the measurement index system 
of the independent directors’ individual social capital, and empirically analyzes 
governance effect of the independent director system.  
The first part of this dissertation traces the theoretical origin of independent 
directors and social capital, and analyses the influence of independent directors’ social 
capital on their supervisory duties respectively from the formal institution (law) and 
informal institution (culture or trust). In the second part, we embed Chinese special 
social relationships and network structures, and construct itemized and comprehensive 
index system of independent directors’ individual social capital and deeply analyze 
independent directors’ value concept and behavior characteristics under revering the 
concept of “horizontal, vertical and social reputation”. Based on the second part, 
through empirical analysis the third part of the dissertation mainly discusses corporate 
information disclosure quality, double principal agent problem, the relationship 
between executives compensation and company performance, and corporate 
performance. Empirical results show that both itemized and comprehensive 
measurement index of independent director’s social capital are conducive to 














executive compensation and corporate performance, reducing agency cost, and 
ultimately improving the business performance of the company comprehensively. In 
consideration of the difference of the formal law protection and the informal 
institutional background, empirical results show that in areas with weak law 
protection or a shortage of trust, positive effect of independent director’s social capital 
is more significantly, and could be a vanguard role model.  
The main innovations and contributions of this dissertation are as follows: 
1. Embedding Chinese cultural customs, social relations and system background 
in the research and using the public disclosure information of independent directors to 
construct a comprehensive and three partial measurement index system of 
independent directors’ individual social capital，which is the first one in China and 
enriches the research literature of corporate governance. 
2. From the perspective of independent director’s social capital, this dissertation 
has verified the policy effect of the independent director system for the first time in 
China. Since information disclosure, principal-agent problem and the relationship 
between executive compensation and company performance appear, they have been 
the focus of corporate governance and financial accounting research. But the existing 
domestic and foreign literatures mainly concentrated on CEO, general manager or 
director and the formal law system. So the concept of “social capital of independent 
directors” is the first time to be introduced in the research field of corporate 
governance. Empirical results show that the more abundant social cost of independent 
directors is, the higher company information disclosure quality is. And richer social 
capital of independent directors is more conducive to reduce agency cost, enhance the 
inherent relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance, 
and further improve operating performance comprehensively. This study enriches the 
social capital theory and broadens the research field of corporate governance 
environment. 
3. This dissertation enriches research literatures on the interaction and 
substitution relationship between social capital of independent directors and law 













between social capital and the law protection, yet from the perspective of corporate 
governance, such as information disclosure and proxy agency, there isn’t any paper 
trying to analyze the substitution effect of independent directors’ social capital and 
law protection, and the research perspective is innovative in the existing literatures at 
home and abroad. This empirical study found that in the area with weak law 
protection, independent directors’ social capital is conductive to improve the 
information disclosure quality, reduce the agency cost and enhance the sensitivity 
between executive compensation and firm performance more significantly. 
4. This dissertation enriches literatures on the substitution relationship between 
social capital of independent directors and the level of regional trust. There are lots of 
existing literatures analyzing the influence of external environment differences on the 
behavior of the company, but research literatures on the substitution relationship 
between social capital and the informal institution (trust) are rare. Empirical results 
show that the individual social capital has a significant substitution effect in the 
region with a low level of trust and plays a vanguard role in the aspect of improving 
corporate governance efficiency.  
Key Words: Independent Directors；Social Capital；Principal-Agent Cost; 



















第一章 导论............................................................................................... 1 
第一节 研究问题提出........................................................................................... 1 
第二节 研究内容和研究框架............................................................................... 6 
第三节 研究的主要创新之处............................................................................... 8 
第二章 文献综述 .................................................................................... 10 
第一节 独立董事文献综述................................................................................. 11 
第二节 社会资本文献综述................................................................................. 22 
第三章  独立董事社会资本的衡量指标体系 ...................................... 39 
第一节 社会资本的分类..................................................................................... 40 
第二节 独立董事社会资本的衡量指标............................................................. 44 
第四章 独立董事社会资本与信息披露 ................................................ 49 
第一节 文献回顾与研究假设............................................................................. 51 
第二节 研究设计................................................................................................. 56 
第三节 实证结果与分析..................................................................................... 63 
第四节 本章结论................................................................................................. 92 
第五章 独立董事社会资本与代理成本 ................................................ 94 
第一节 理论分析与研究假设............................................................................. 95 
第二节 研究设计............................................................................................... 104 
第三节 实证结果与分析................................................................................... 112 
第四节 本章结论............................................................................................... 144 
第六章 独立董事社会资本与高管薪酬-绩效敏感性 ........................ 146 
第一节 国内外文献回顾................................................................................... 149 
第二节 研究设计............................................................................................... 156 
第三节 实证结果与结论分析........................................................................... 160 













第七章  独立董事社会资本与公司绩效 ............................................ 170 
第一节 制度背景............................................................................................... 171 
第二节 文献回顾与研究假设........................................................................... 172 
第三节 研究设计............................................................................................... 174 
第四节 实证结果与分析................................................................................... 183 
第五节 本章结论............................................................................................... 193 
第八章 结论........................................................................................... 194 
第一节 研究结论............................................................................................... 194 
第二节 研究启示与政策建议........................................................................... 195 
第三节 研究局限性与未来研究展望............................................................... 196 
参考文献 ................................................................................................. 197 
读博期间的科研成果 ............................................................................ 210 















Chapter1 Introduction.............................................................................. 1 
1 Research Topic ................................................................................................... 1 
2 Contents and Framework of the Research ...................................................... 6 
3 Innovation of the Research ............................................................................... 8 
Chapter2 Literature Review .................................................................. 10 
1 Review on Independent Directors .................................................................. 11 
2 Review on Social Capital ................................................................................. 22 
Chapter 3 Measure Index System on Independent Directors’ Social 
 Capital  .................................................................................................. 39 
1 Classification of Social Capital ....................................................................... 40 
2 Mesure Index on Independent Directors' Social Capital ............................. 44        
Chapter4 Independent Directors’Social Capital and Information 
Disclosure ................................................................................................. 49 
1 Literature Review and Research Hypothesis ................................................ 51 
2 Research Design ............................................................................................... 56 
3 Empirical Results and Analysis ...................................................................... 63 
4 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 92 
Chapter5 Independent Directors’Social Capital and Agency Cost ... 94 
1 Theory Analysis and Research Hypothesis .................................................... 95 
2 Research Design ............................................................................................. 104 
3 Empirical Results and Analysis .................................................................... 112 
4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 144 
Chapter6 Independent Directors’Social Capital and Top Managers 
Pay- Performance Sensitivity ............................................................... 146 













2 Research Design ............................................................................................. 156 
3 Empirical Results and Analysis .................................................................... 160 
4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 168 
Chapter7 Independent Directors’Social Capital and Company 
Performance .......................................................................................... 170 
1 Institutional Background .............................................................................. 171 
2 Theory Analysis and Research Hypothesis .................................................. 172 
3 Research Design ............................................................................................. 174 
4 Empirical Results and Analysis .................................................................... 183 
5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 193 
Chapter8 Conclusions ........................................................................... 194 
1 Research Conclusion ...................................................................................... 194 
2 Research Instruction and Political Suggestion ............................................ 195 
3 Limitation and Future Research Direction.................................................. 196 
References .............................................................................................. 197 
My Research During Ph.D's Study ..................................................... 210 





















Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and 
Dissertations Database”.  
Fulltexts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on 
http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit requests online, or consult the interlibrary 
loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn 
for delivery details. 
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
